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The Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change (Stern et al. 2006a, b; Stern 2007)
has been the catalyst of an enormous amount of discussion since its release in the fall of
2006. Policy makers see it as an authoritative report that makes an economic case for rapid
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Most economists have a different opinion of the
quality of the analysis, even though there is a virtual consensus among economists that
climate change is a serious externality which calls for the immediate implementation of a
carbon tax or some other type of policy intervention. Economists who have glanced at the
Stern Review typically argue, for example, that its choice of ethical parameters (rate of pure
time preference, rate of risk aversion) is peculiar, biased, and potentially misleading to be
point of being counterproductive (Arrow 2007; Dasgupta 2007; Varian 2006; Yohe and Tol
2007a, b). Analysts who took a closer look at the Stern Review tend to notice a range of
other assumptions that are questionable, and many have lamented what they perceive to be
inadequate documentation (Jensen and Webster 2007; Mendelsohn 2006; Nordhaus 2007a;
Pielke, 2007; Tol 2006; Tol and Yohe 2006; Yohe 2006; Yohe and Tol 2007b). Some papers
claim that the Stern Review underestimated the impacts of climate change (Neumayer 2007;
Spash 2007; Sterner and Persson 2007), while other papers argue that human-induced
climate change is not real (Byatt et al. 2006; Carter et al. 2006). Neither position has any
empirical support. The Stern Review team has published a number of rebuttals to our
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concerns and those of others (Anderson 2007; Dietz et al. 2007a, b, c; Hamid et al. 2007;
Stern and Taylor 2007), but we are not convinced that our concerns have been addressed
adequately. To be clear, economists who have studied climate change usually conclude that
an economic case for greenhouse gas emission reduction has been made; they worry only
that the Stern Review failed to make the case because it put ideology ahead of analytics
(Nordhaus 2007b; Weitzman 2007; Yohe et al. 2007).1 We all generally agree with
Weitzman’s (2007) assessment: the Stern Review is “right for the wrong reasons”.
Climatic Change is now publishing four more essays on the Stern Review, and here we
use them to launch our discussion—one in which we occasionally defend the Stern Review
as we reiterate and extend our earlier contributions. Terry Barker played a central role in
this collection—authoring two papers and contributing editorial guidance to the other two.
In the one he authored alone, Barker (this volume) argues that the Stern Review is an assault
on neo-classical economics and utilitarianism.2 It is not. Indeed, the Stern Review is firmly
rooted in both traditions (Jensen and Webster 2007; Neumeyer 2007; Spash 2007). For
instance, Dasgupta (2007) makes this point when he criticises the Stern Review for not
explicitly introducing inequity aversion into its calculus. Doing so would have been only a
modest deviation from the utilitarian framework within which its authors operated. It is
important to note, of course, that Fankhauser et al. (1998) have shown why adding this
component would have changed the results of the Stern Review’s inherent cost–benefit
analyses substantially.
Quiggin (this volume) devotes his entire essay to discounting. It is here, of course, that
the Review attracted so much criticism from mainstream economists, including ourselves.
This criticism was not generally born of the Review’s authors’ choosing a very low discount
rate based on a very low pure rate of time preference. We expect, in fact, that many of the
same authors would have been equally critical if the Stern Review had adopted a very high
discount rate based on a very high pure rate of time preference. Indeed, most commentaries
were critical because the Stern Review chose to work with only one discount rate, and a
peculiar one at that, and did not explore the ramifications of alternative reflections of inter-
temporal impatience.
The pure rate of time preference is, to some, purely an ethical parameter—a
manifestation of one’s value system that reflects how much less one cares about the future
than about today simply because it is the future (Arrow et al. 1996; Portney and Weyant
1999). Moral philosophers have elaborate theories about what the pure rate of time
preference ought to be (e.g., Broome 1992), and the Stern Review devotes considerable
space justifying its choice of an extraordinarily low value on those theories. At the same
time, however, people and government express their pure rates of time preference in their
every day decisions (Nordhaus 1997). Quiggin (this volume) cites a single observation (low
risk bonds) that suggests that the “market” pure rate of time preference is near zero,3 but
Frederick et al. (2002) surveyed a much wider empirical base and found very little
empirical support for individual time preferences near zero. Evans and Sezer (2004, 2005)
estimate social rates of pure time preference for rich countries, and find a range of 0.8–1.5.
1 Sir Nicholas was duly promoted to become Lord Stern, Baron of (ironically) Brentford, and life peer in the
House of Lords.
2 Nelson (2008) similarly makes Lord Stern of Brentford an unlikely champion of feminist economics.
3 Quiggin also advocates using a value of 1.0 to reflect (relative) aversion to risk—another parameter that
reflects human behavior and attitudes; this is the same value used by Stern et al. (2006a, b). We note that
Evans (2005) estimates a value of 1.4 using evidence from tax data and a method originally developed by
Stern (1977).
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By choosing a pure rate of time preference that deviates from any average of observed pure
rates of time preference, the authors of the Stern Review essentially assert that their value is
right and other people’s values are wrong. Indeed, Jensen and Webster (2007), Nordhaus
(2007a) and Weitzman (2007) all accuse the Stern Review of paternalism.
Although commissioned by HM Government, the Stern Review also deviates from the
standard discounting procedures in the UK. Quiggin (this volume) dismisses this
observation as a neat but irrelevant debating point. We disagree. If governments use one
principle of time discounting for climate policy and another principle for other policies,
then they are crafting internally inconsistent policy portfolios that are, themselves,
unethical. Using a low discount rate for climate policy and a high discount rate for road
safety or health care immediately implies, for example, that future deaths due to climate
change are more important than future deaths due to road accidents or inadequate hospitals.
Put another way, if governments agree with the Stern Review, then they should substantially
increase investments in R&D, education, health care, and pensions—and taxes too.4 Of
course, Nordhaus (2007b) has shown that following this route would necessitate dramatic
increases in aggregate savings that would emphatically slow the pace of economic growth
for a very long time. The key to understanding his point is simply to recognize that the
discount rate is fundamentally a direct representation of the opportunity cost of investment.
Put another way, reducing the discount rate necessarily implies that investment in less
profitable projects should and would be undertaken.
As an aside, we should note that there are economic circumstances under which
adopting a low discount rate when evaluating the relative efficacy of a public investment
satisfies efficiency criteria. In countries where the private return to capital is taxed, for
example, the appropriate discount rate for public investment can fall well below the market
return on private investment (and even converge to zero) if public investments (strongly)
complement private investments in the sense of increasing the productivity of privately held
capital (Ogura and Yohe 1977). Returns to private capital are certainly taxed at various rates
across most the world. We also expect that a strong case could be made that public
investment in mitigation would complement private investment across many if not all of
those countries. The specific degree of complementarity has not yet been evaluated, so this
argument cannot be applied. Nonetheless, the underlying ambiguity is just one of the
reasons why, in our work, we did not ignore low discount rates. Instead, we explored the
sensitivity of results across a wide range of possible values to get a handle on what
difference it makes. To nobody’s surprise, we found that it makes an enormous amount of
difference—a conclusion that the Stern Review team, itself, recognized in its postscript
(Stern et al. 2006b).
Barker (this volume) also heralds the Stern Review’s apparent deviation from marginal
calculus of neo-classical economics, but we fear that he is mistaken on two fundamental
grounds. First of all, the Stern Review still aims at an optimal climate policy. We know this
because the authors spend so much effort time justifying the low pure rate of time
preference that they insert into the first term of the Ramsey (1928) discounting equation
when they compute their estimates of climate damages.5 Secondly, the connection between
optimality and marginality has nothing to do with economics—neo-classical or otherwise;
4 Kenny (2007) shows that the Stern Review also implies a massive redistribution of income across the globe.
5 This equation, highlighted in Quiggin (this volume), adds the pure rate of time preference (the utility
discount rate) to the product of the elasticity of the marginal utility of per capita consumption and the rate of
growth of per capita consumption—a result that is derived only from an optimal growth model.
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and it is not derived exclusively from a reliance on benefit–cost analyses. This connection
is a central part of the calculus developed by Leibniz and Newton. Indeed, an “optimum”
that does not meet its first-order conditions, like that in the Stern Review, is just bad
mathematics.
Jaeger et al. (this volume) argue similarly when they protest the maximisation of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) as a policy objective. They seem to criticize the Stern Review
team for comparing their damage estimates for climate change, calibrated quantitatively as
the “equivalent” of percentage losses in GDP, with the suffering inflicted upon individuals
by the major wars of the past century. To be fair, Stern et al. (2006a, b) concludes that
climate change could produce “risks of major disruption to economic and social activity,
on a scale similar to those associated with the great wars and economic depressions of the
first half of the 20th century” (our emphasis). To our reading, this is not a comparison of
the economic consequences of wars, depressions, and damages attributed to climate
change much less a comparison confined to a single economic measure (GDP). Jaeger et
al. (this volume) also rail against what they call Adam Smith’s (1776; cf. Arrow and
Debreu 1954) fallacy of social optimum born of the independent actions of self-interested
economic agents. Alfred Pigou (1920; cf. Baumol 1972) have already shown that this is
not true in the presence of externalities, a fact that is mentioned in any textbook. The Stern
Review got this right, too, by correctly framing climate change as an externality of global
proportion.
In short, as noted above and emphasized by Barker (this volume) and Quiggin (this
volume), economic models do not maximise GDP or income. They focus on utility (though
Stern et al. (2006a, b) go to great lengths to convert lost utility into an economic metric-
reduction in the certainty equivalent consumption path). The distinction between welfare
and GDP dates back to Bernouilli (1954/1738), and it is well known that GDP is a bad
approximation for welfare. Ironically, a younger Nordhaus laid the foundations for the
measurement of the “green” Net National Product (Nordhaus and Tobin 1972). Jaeger and
colleagues have set up a strawman to fight against, but they are tilting at windmills that do
not exist in the Review.
It is in the context of clarifying the appropriate application of utility-based approach
adopted by the Stern Review team where we hope to have contributed to a more correct
economic interpretation of the economic case for climate policy. Our disagreements with
the methods and assumptions of the Stern Review (but not its fundamental conclusion that
an economic case can be made for immediate climate policy) can be summarized in a series
of succinct statements:
1. Stern et al. (2006a, b) use an extraordinarily low discount rate without reporting a
sensitivity analysis (e.g., Nordhaus 2007a).
2. The time horizon in the Stern Review is too short for the chosen discount rate because
the calculated post-2200 residuals contain up to 50% of the damages (e.g., Yohe
2006).
3. The Stern Review’s low discount rate does not match the equally low assumed rate of
risk aversion (e.g., Dasgupta 2007; Weitzman 2007).
4. Stern et al. (2006a, b) do not separate risk aversion from inequity aversion (e.g.,
Dasgupta 2007).
5. Stern et al. (2006a, b) use the ill-defined “relative change in the balanced growth
equivalent” as their welfare measure (e.g., Tol and Yohe 2007).
6. In the Stern Review, vulnerability to climate change is assumed to be constant (e.g.,
Sterner and Persson 2007 and Tol and Yohe 2007).
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7. Stern et al. (2006a, b) assume, implicitly, that there is no learning about the climate
system or the driving socio-economic system as the future unfolds (e.g., Yohe and Tol
2007a, b).
8. Stern et al. (2006a, b) confuse the costs of climate change with the benefits of
emission reduction (e.g., Anthoff and Tol 2008).
9. Stern et al. (2006a, b) overestimate the impact of climate change by cherry picking
(e.g., Pielke 2007).
10. Stern et al. (2006a, b) underestimate the costs of emission reduction (e.g., Tol and
Yohe 2006, 2007).
11. The documentation of Stern et al. (2006a, b) is incomplete and inconsistent (e.g.,
Weitzman 2007), and the Stern Review generally violates the rules of good practice in
policy analysis (e.g., Cole 2007).
This list of concerns, notwithstanding, we think that there are sound economic
arguments for greenhouse gas emission reduction that can inform both the long-term goals
of climate policy and the short-term steps that should be taken immediately.
Interestingly, Hasselmann and Barker (this volume) ultimately propose the creation of a
technocratic body that would decide global climate policy in both time-frames. We are, at
the same time, concerned that creating such a global governing body from scratch would be
a political impossibility and amused that they do not see the Conference of the Parties (the
COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change as the politically
feasible incarnation of their idea (subject to the constraint of participation by all nations).
While we may all wonder whether or not the COP will ever function effectively as a body
entrusted to set global climate policy, recent negotiations have pushed on adaptation and
mitigation fronts to frame responses to climate risks. Indeed, the COP is now working
within the risk-management approach of the sort espoused by Barker (this volume) because
IPCC (2007) achieved unanimous government consent to the conclusion that:
“Responding to climate change involves an iterative risk management process that
includes both adaptation and mitigation and takes into account climate change
damages, co-benefits, sustainability, equity, and attitudes to risk.”
This assertion makes it clear that the nations who participate in the IPCC/UNFCCC
process now profess that policy makers need a new decision-support paradigm.6 In IPCC
(2007), this assertion is followed by statements that noting the wide range of published
estimates of the social cost of carbon, the sources of this range, the inherent inability to
quantify all impacts, and the resulting difficulty in comparing the global benefits and costs
of mitigation and, by inference in some cases, the more locally defined benefits and costs of
adaptation.
In the past, we have confronted this complication by exploiting the fact that atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases depend on cumulative emissions over time. As a result,
achieving any targeted concentration limit (and thus a corresponding range of possible
temperature increases and associated climate risks) is fundamentally an exhaustible
resource problem. The long-standing Hotelling (1931) result therefore applies, at least to
a first approximation: to maximize the discounted value of welfare derived from an
exhaustible resource (that is, to minimize the discounted costs of limiting cumulative
6 Barker (this volume) argued that this need was recognized starting with the Second Assessment Report in
IPCC (1995), but it was not until the Working Group III plenary in May of 2007 and the Synthesis Report
plenary the following November that this conclusion was elevated to plenary approved language.
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emissions over the long-term), simply calculate the appropriate initial “scarcity rent” (in this
case, an initial price for carbon) and let it increase over time at the rate of interest. To be
more specific, the Hotelling (1931) result means that it is enough to specify an initial price
of carbon (or perhaps setting targeted permit price for a cap and trade system) as long as it
is understood that this rent will increase persistently and predictably at the rate of interest.
This initial price should be designed to get the attention of the business community and to
show political leadership in the face of a serious problem. It need not, however, be set so
high that it would cause undue economic harm in the short-run. Allowing the carbon price
to increase year after year even while acknowledging that adjustments for new knowledge
about climate risk will have to be accommodated over time would give the policy traction—
this is our representation of the long-term context within which the iterative process now
accepted by the COP can function.
We now add some texture to this representation by focusing attention on three different
sources of economic justification for climate policy: efficiency, equity, and risk. The
efficiency justification for emission abatement is a simple externality argument with which
no economist would quibble. The impacts caused by climate change are an unintended and
uncompensated side-effect of economic transactions that emit greenhouse gases. To restore
efficiency, this externality must be internalized by a carbon tax, if the impacts are
predominantly negative, or carbon subsidy, if the impacts are predominantly positive. The
empirical literature on the economic impacts of climate change finds that impacts are
largely negative (Smith et al. 2001 and Smith and Hitz 2003). Although positive impacts
have been identified, these are limited in time, space and size. Since estimates of the
marginal damage cost of carbon dioxide emissions are indeed predominantly positive (Tol
2005), greenhouse gas emissions should be taxed.
An argument for emission abatement based on equity is much more difficult to make. On
the surface, it is easy. Rich people emit much more carbon dioxide than do poor people,
particularly on a per capita basis, and poor people are much more vulnerable to climate
change. Climate change therefore constitutes an unacceptable transfer of wealth from poor
to rich. Some may find this simple framing of the issue convincing, but its economic
underpinnings are not particularly persuasive. If greenhouse gas emission reduction is
relatively expensive and potentially ineffective over the next several decades at least,
helping poor people to adapt to climate change would be cheaper, easier, and may have
positive spillovers on development in general (Schelling 1995 and Tol 2005).
The risk argument for emission abatement is again straightforward. Moomaw et al.
(2001) have estimated that we have sufficient reserves of fossil fuel to make Planet Earth
intolerably hot. It follows that we will have to stop burning fossil fuels before they run out.
IPCC (2007) has meanwhile highlighted growing evidence that we may commit ourselves
to severe impacts with only a few degrees of warming; even though the likelihood may be
small, the now accepted risk calculus suggests that some attempts should be made to reduce
those critical probabilities. This implies that the maximum allowable amount of carbon
dioxide emissions is smaller than the potential amount of emissions. The constraint on
allowable cumulative emissions is therefore binding, and we are back in the Hotelling
(1931) world and we are again calling for a carbon tax.
We now have two sound economic arguments for using a carbon tax to frame the
approach to long-term climate policy and one argument that is definitely not an argument
for a carbon subsidy. Uncertainties about future emissions, climate change, and climate
impacts sustain a wide range of estimates of the social cost of carbon which can, for present
purposes, be interpreted as the appropriate Pigouvian tax for current emissions (Tol 2007);
even with a 3% pure rate of time preference, the median estimate here is $20 per tonne of
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carbon. The downside risks of climate change are poorly understood, though, and these
estimates do not include many possible impacts (Yohe and Tirpak 2008). While reasonable
people disagree how much of a risk premium should be placed on top of the Pigou tax, it
should be clear that no reasonable person would argue that this premium should be zero. An
estimate of 50% is not out of the question, especially given a non-zero likelihood of
catastrophic damage in some regions of the world. This would make $30 per tonne of
carbon ($8 per tonne of CO2) an economically justifiable point of departure (increasing at
the rate of interest over time) for framing the current view of the long-term.
What about the short-term—the first iteration in the process identified in IPCC (2007)?
To inform this decision, one might compare what it would take to make natural gas more
attractive than coal for pending investments to add new generating capacity in the USA
over the next few decades (Yohe et al. 2007). Much of this capacity is currently planned as
conventional coal-fired technology, but a CO2 price of only $18 per tonne of carbon ($5/
tCO2) would be sufficient to make new gas-fired generators as economical as new coal-
fired plants (based on the present value of fixed and variable costs). This number is much
lower for new plants than the $100/tC ($27/tCO2) required to inspire existing plants to
switch because the lower cost of building a new gas plant compensates for some of its
higher fuel cost, but it would be sufficient to avoid significant “locked in” carbon intensive
investments in future capacity. To make a large step toward near zero carbon technologies
(e.g., carbon capture and sequestration) would require a somewhat higher CO2 price—
estimated at around $90/tC ($25/tCO2) by several sources and included in Pacala and
Socolow (2004) as one possible “wedge” of emissions reduction. Even so, since power
generators last 30 to 40 years, a carbon tax that increases predictably over time, as the
Hotelling result requires, could make CCS technologies attractive even if the precise
“tipping point” is not reached until some years after the new plant starts operating.
The point we want to underline here is that these economic arguments can be made
without resorting to dodgy modeling or peculiar assumptions. Taxing greenhouse gas
emissions now makes perfect economic sense. However, climate policy will always be
unpopular in some circles. Lobbying against carbon taxes or other forms of regulation will
continue to be intense because concerns about their economic costs will persist. Therefore,
the case for climate policy should be based on sober, even-handed, and high-quality
research. A claim, like Terry Barker’s, that the economic case for climate change constitutes
a revolution in the discipline makes it easy to dismiss the arguments for climate policy as
wild-eyed fantasies of burning textbooks. Shoddy analysis and questionable assumptions,
like Lord Stern of Brentford’s, only provide easy ammunition for those with vested interests
in preserving the current fossil fuel economy, and all of this is completely unnecessary.
Standard economic tools applied under standard economic assumptions call for greenhouse
gas emission abatement today.
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